"These forces [Kopassus] are "legendary for their cruelty," Benedict Anderson observes: in East Timor they "became the pioneer and exemplar for every kind of atrocity," including systematic rapes, tortures and executions, and organization of hooded gangsters." Noam Chomsky
NEW = Added to BACK DOOR Website since last Monday's Emailout
Feb
12 Asia Times: Indonesia-Australia: Shaking hands with clenched fists
Analysis added Feb 13
"Signing a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) on counterterrorism with a country so internally inconsistent and
fragile, while at the same time expecting solid and sustainable
outcomes,
will hardly keep Australia-Indonesia relations at a “realistic” level.
... the bilateral MoU includes the provision for the training
and education of Indonesian officials. Could not that training and
education also be used against Acehnese and West
Papuan secessionists? Australia once before crossed over this line
of aiding the Indonesian internal security apparatus when it allowed
its
Special Air Service (SAS) to train and exercise with Indonesia’s
special
forces, Kopussus. Kopussus used the knowledge gained by their joint
training with the SAS against many local anti-Javanese insurgents,
including
the East Timorese, much to the embarrassment of the Australian
government
and the outrage of Australian and international human-rights groups."
Purnendra
Jain, professor, Center for Asian Studies, Adelaide University &
John
Bruni, adjunct lecturer, Politics Department, Adelaide University,
Australia
Feb
10 SunHerald: Snub Kopassus News added Feb 13
"The Indonesian Army now admits its brutal
special forces unit, Kopassus, was involved in the recent murder of
West Papuan independence leader Theys Eluay but Prime Minister John
Howard
appears to have opened the door for Australian
SAS troops to again train Kopassus. ... At the time, the Nine
Network’s
Sunday program revealed details of a joint SAS/Kopassus training
exercise
in which captured East Timorese independence fighters were forced to
act
as targets. The Australian public did not support this sort of
training."
Sun Herald (Sydney)
Jan
30/31 Free East Timor Japan Coalition letter to UNSG
Letter
added Feb 1
"Regarding East Timor Serious Crimes Unit
and the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court, we
welcome your emphasis on the need for further assistance. However, we
are
at the same time disappointed by your positive reference to the “Los
Palos
case,” as in the judgement passed in this case on 11 December 2001,
Indonesian
Kopassus
(special forces) lieutenant Sayful Anwar was not tried, because
Indonesia
did not reply to UNTAET’s extradiction appeal. This also shows that
Indonesia
is not serious about bringing those responsible to justice, and that,
for
the East Timorese judicial system to function to achieve due justice,
international
pressure on Indonesia, not words of encouragement, is necessary." Free
East Timor! Japan Coalition
Jul
30 JSMP: Los Palos trial enters second stage News from
ETimor added Aug 1
"During the cross examination, the militia
members have testified to their strong links with KOPASSUS, the
Indonesian
special forces, ever since Team Alpha was established in the mid 1980s.
One of the accused also confirmed that he had been paid 75 000 rupiah
per
month for being a militia member. The same accused confirmed that the
militia
had been informed by KOPASSUS of the “Operation Cleansing”, the first
step
in which was to kill everyone who voted for independence, the second
step
to destroy all buildings in East Timor made by Indonesians." Judicial
System Monitoring Programme news service
Jul
13 JSMP: Team Alpha militia members testify to Kopassus links
News from ETimor added July 14
"In the first trial involving crimes
against
humanity being heard by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the
Dili
District Court, several Team Alpha militia members have testified this
week to their strong links with KOPASSUS, the Indonesian military
special
forces. They confirmed that as militia members they were trained and
armed
by KOPASSUS to fight FALINTIL." Judicial
System Monitoring Programme news service
Jun
14 CSUCS: Child Soldiers Global Report 2001 - East Timor Chapter
Report added June 25
"Past Child Recruitment and Deployment:
The Indonesian armed forces provided pro-integration militias –
particularly
KOPASSUS
special forces – with training, arms and funding. “The first time they
took me from my house we had to rape a woman and then kill anything we
could find like animals and people. They ordered us to rape. We did
this
together. Everyday we were taken by them by car to burn houses, kill
animals
and harass people ... They screamed and shouted when they had killed
people
and showed off their machetes covered in blood and said ‘Eat the
People’.”
Former Militia Child Soldier, 16 years old." Coalition to Stop the Use
of Child Soldiers
May
9 GLW: UN lets Indonesian military off the hook
Article
with comments from BACK DOOR updated May 16
"The UN’s response to a
report written by James Dunn, a former Australian consul to East
Timor
and a prominent writer and analyst on East Timor, and leaked to the
media
two weeks ago, was also very telling. Dunn’s report sheeted blame for
the
killings, destruction and mass deportation of East Timorese to the
Indonesian
Armed Forces (TNI), particularly Kopassus officers who
organised
and led covert operations in East Timor some months before the
independence
ballot." Vanya Tanaja
Major Report Apr
30 KPP HAM's Secret Report on Crimes Against Humanity in ETimor
Link to full text added May 3
"39. After President Habibie launched
the two options, these old militia groups were revived and supported in
order to achieve victory for Autonomy. Besides this, military units for
young people were supported, which according to Udayana Military Region
Commander Major-General Adam R. Damiri in his report to the Minister
Coordinating
the Fields of Political and Security were “Pro-integration groups
driven
by young people to establish patriotic organisations. According to
various
reports, these young people were members of Gada Paksi (Young Guard
Establishing
Integration), which was recruited, trained and funded by the TNI,
especially
Kopassus,
in 1994-1995. Eurico Gueterres, the leader of the Aitarak militia, and
the leaders of the BMP militia in Dili were figures in the Gada Paksi.
These militia groups were later recruited into the Integration Fighting
Force with its Commander Joao Tavares and deputy Eurico Gueterres and
head
of staff Herminio da Costa da Silva. ...
110. Around 10.10 the Aitarak leadership
Eurico Gutteres (P:3) was present, in a Kijang driven by a member of Kopassus
{Special Forces Command]. ...
IV.13 The murder of the church group
at Los Palos 25 September 1999 (E:152):
Based on statements that were able to
be collected, it is known that on 25 September 1999 an attack took
place
on a church group that was journeying to Baucau, by the Tim Alfa
militia
group (P:637) consisting of Joni Marques (P:783), Joao da Costa
(P:785),
Manuel da Costa (P:786), and Amilio da Costa (P:791).
In its investigation visit to East Timor,
the Investigative Commission met with the suspects who were suspected
of
carrying out executions outside the process of law, in the Interfet
detention
centre in Dili, and obtained a direct statement from Joni Marques
(B:797).
The Investigative Committee also obtained statements that the militia
group
Tim Alfa had been formed and trained by a Kopassus unit. Based
on
the testimony of a perpetrator to the Investigative Commission, the
involvement
of a member of a Kopassus unit who had ordered the killing was
stated.
There were nine victims of the mass
killings:
Agus Mulyawan (K:780), Indonesian journalist; Celeste de Carvalho
(K:773),
Head Sister; Erminia Cazzaniga (K:779), nun; Erminia Rudy Barreto
(K:&&&);
Fernando dos Santos (K:774); Jacinto F. Xavier (K:775); a youth of 13
(K:782);
Titi Sandora Lopez (K:781); Valerioda Conceicao (K:776). ...
The involvement of the civilian and
military
apparatuses including the police cooperated with the pro-integration
militia
groups in crimes against humanity. This represented abuse of power and
authority and resulted in the involvement of military institutions as
well
as civil agencies. To be more specific, the evidence shows officials in
the civil and military institutions, including the police, that are
thought
to have been involved, comprised, although were not limited to the
following
names: ...
17. Commandant of Company, B-Battalion
744: a Kopassus Officer/SGI BKO Korem Dili: Captain Tatang"
Indonesian Commission of Investigation
into Human Rights Violations (KPP HAM)
Major Report Apr
25 Suppressed UN report on East Timor destruction Link
to full text of report added Apr 30
" ... 14. Militia violence against
supporters
of independence began early in 1999, and in earnest in April when
Operasi
Sapu jagad (Operation Clean Sweep) was launched. However, the main
thrust
of the violence occurred between 4th September, when the results of the
plebiscite were announced in Dili, and the end of September, when the
INTERFET
force was able to restore security to the central and eastern sectors
of
East Timor. This operation of massive destruction, ransacking and
deportation
was also devised by the TNI when it was realised that the plebiscite
was
likely to go against integration. Accordingly, in July the TNI began
developing
Operasi Wiradharma, the evacuation of East Timor, an operation which
apparently
also used the code-name, Guntur. The plan, which was devised at least
two
months before it was launched, was commanded by TNI Kopassus
officers,
with Major Generals Zakky Anwar Makarim and Adam Damiri playing key
command
roles. According to informed sources in Jakarta, it was planned to
deport
most of East Timor’s population to West Timor, from where they would
later
be dispersed to other parts of the archipelago. The planners seemed to
believe that the violence would persuade the MPR, the Indonesian
Parliament,
to reject the outcome of the ballot. The operation began in the
immediate
aftermath of the announcing of the results of the plebiscite, and was
focused
on the deportation of a large part of the population of East Timor, the
destruction of most houses and buildings, and on a campaign of terror
against
the staff of UNAMET, foreign journalists and other foreigners present
in
East Timor at that time. ...
V. The Role of the Indonesian Military,
the Formation of the Militia and the campaign of Terror: ...
18. It is against this background that
the setting up of the militia and the way it resorted to brutal tactics
need to be considered. The origins of Timorese para-military units have
already been examined. The militia as it existed in 1999, and as an
extension
of the para-military force Halilintar, go back to the eighties when
East
Timorese para-military units were again formed, specifically to involve
the local population in operations not only against Falintil,
the armed resistance, but against the growing phenomenon of passive
resistance. The best known of these early units was Team Alpha
(Tim
Alfa) which, with Team Saka (Tim Saka), was formed in 1986 in the
eastern
sector of East Timor by a Kopassus officer, Captain Luhud
Pandjaitan,
reportedly acting on orders from his commander, then Colonel Prabowo. Team
Alpha’s members were trained and paid, and their operations against
pro-independence elements organised, by Indonesian military officers.
Another
significant move was the setting up of the Gada Paksi (Gadu Penegak
Integrasi—Guards
to Uphold Integration) in 1994, also reportedly by Prabowo. The Gada
Paksi
was conceived as a way of mobilizing young pro-integration activists.
...
VIII. The Major Killings and their
Characteristics: ...
e. Lautem/Lospalos
36. The eastern districts of East Timor
did not suffer the same level of violence, and several villages, among
them Uatolari and Viqueque, virtually escaping destruction by the
militia.
Individual acts of violence or killing did begin early, however.
On 17 March 1999 Mariano Soares, a prominent citizen of Triloka village
disappeared, and is believed to have been killed. A week later another
Timorese was killed by TNI troops in the Baucau district. On 17 April
members
of Team Alpha killed Virgilio de Sousa, a prominent
independence
supporter in his home in Bauro Village in Los Palos. In August, in the
eve of the plebiscite Los Palos village chief, Verissimo Quintas was
brutally
killed by local militia, following an attack on his house.
37. The worst period for the Los
Palos/Baucau
occurred well after the plebiscite. On 12 September four Timorese were
killed, reportedly by TNI troops, at the Lospalos Military sub-district
command, and on the same day 5 persons were said to have been killed at
Baucau by Battalion 745 troops. The worst massacre in the area occurred
on 25 September, five days after INTERFET troops landed at Dili. Team
Alpa
members killed and mutilated nine people, including nuns and deacons
and
an Indonesian journalist, on the road between Los Palos and Baucau. The
bodies were placed in their vehicle which was then pushed into the Luro
River. Team Alpha operated under the control of Kopassus
officers, and the local TNI commander. According to the KPP HAM report
a member of Kopassus was implicated in the ordering of this
killing.
...
Annex A: Senior Indonesian Military
Officers who should be Investigated in Relation to Crimes Against
Humanity
in East Timor: ...
14. Lieutenant Colonel Sudrajat
AS
1998-99 Commander Kodim 1629 (Lautem,
Lospalos)
Comments: Commander of the district in
which Team Alpha was active, and has been accused of having
supplied
weapons to the militia.
Assessment: According to the KPP
HAM list he is one of the officers implicated in the events of
1999,
and his role should therefore be investigated. ...
Annex B: Select Chronology: ...
September 25: Massacre in Lautem area
when Team Alpha militia ambush vehicle carrying nuns, brothers
and
an Indonesian journalist. Nine person are killed and their bodies
mutilated.
... "
Australian diplomat James Dunn, an
independent
consultant to the Chief Prosecutor for the UN Transitional
Administration
in East Timor's (UNTAET)
Mar
12 Age: Burchill: Not guilty on Timor? Explain this then
Article
"Why did Australia have to train Kopassus
officers, widely known for their brutality and disregard for basic
human
rights? Closer ties between Australia's armed forces and Indonesia's
(TNI),
in the form of joint training exercises and the secretly negotiated
1995
Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement, clearly gave Australia no
influence
whatsoever over the behavior of TNI in 1999, when they and their
militia
proxies razed East Timor." Scott
Burchill, lecturer, international relations, Deakin University
Nov
1999 NI: Make your own militia Chronology added May 24
"How the military did it and who knew:
July 1998: Ausaid worker
Lansell Taudevin tells Australian embassy officials that the Indonesian
army is forming and arming militia gangs. Around 5,000 West Timorese
(ethnically
identical to East Timorese, though Muslim rather than Roman Catholic)
are
recruited into militias by the Indonesian army. More recruits are
brought
in from Java.
4 November 1998: 400
élite
troops from Indonesia’s notorious Kopassus Group 4 unit –
trained
to track down and eliminate political dissidents – arrive in the port
of
Atapupu. ... " new internationalist
Sept
27 1999 Noam Chomsky: East Timor Retrospective - An overview and lessons
"Terror and
destruction
began early in the year. The TNI forces responsible have been described
as "rogue elements" in the West, a questionable judgment. There is good
reason to accept Bishop Belo's assignment of direct responsibility to
commanding
General Wiranto in Jakarta. It appears that the militias have been
managed
by elite units of Kopassus, the "crack special forces unit"
that
had "been training regularly with US and Australian forces until their
behaviour became too much of an embarrassment for their foreign
friends,"
veteran Asia correspondent David Jenkins reports. These forces are
"legendary
for their cruelty," Benedict Anderson observes: in East Timor they
"became
the pioneer and exemplar for every kind of atrocity," including
systematic
rapes, tortures and executions, and organization of hooded gangsters.
They
adopted the tactics of the U.S. Phoenix program in South Vietnam that
killed
tens of thousands of peasants and much of the indigenous South
Vietnamese
leadership, Jenkins writes, as well as "the tactics employed by the
Contras"
in Nicaragua, following lessons taught by their CIA mentors. The state
terrorists were "not simply going after the most radical
pro-independence
people but going after the moderates, the people who have influence in
their community." "It's Phoenix," a well-placed source in Jakarta
reported:
the aim is "to terrorise everyone" -- the NGOs, the Red Cross, the UN,
the journalists."
Noam
Chomsky
BD: Calls for International War Crimes Tribunal - A collection of recent reports, articles and news [section on East Timor's Judicial System]